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To say that positive political theory (PPT) scholarship on the hierarchy of justice
is theory rich and data poor is to make a rather uncontroversial claim. For over
a decade now, scholars have offered intriguing theoretical accounts aimed
at understanding why lower courts defy (comply with) higher courts. But only
rarely do they subject the accounts to rigorous empirical interrogation. The chief
obstacle, it seems, is the lack of a reliable and valid measurement strategy for
placing judges of lower courts and justices of higher courts in the same policy
space. Without such a strategy, we can systematically test few, if any, hypoth-
eses flowing from PPT models of the judicial hierarchy. With such an approach
not only can we investigate the implications of these models, we can assess
many others flowing from the larger PPT program on judging, as well. It is to
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the challenge of scaling judges and justices (as well as legislatures and exec-
utives) that we turn in this article. We begin by explicating our measurement
strategy, and then by explaining its advantages over previous efforts. Next
we explore the results of our approach and provide a descriptive look at data
it yields: a ‘‘Judicial Common Space’’ (JCS) score for all justices and judges
appointed since 1953. The last section offers three applications designed to
shore up the suitability and adaptability of the JCS for a range of positive proj-
ects on the courts.
1. Introduction
The US Supreme Court’s decision in Roper v. Simmons (2005), which inva-
lidated the death penalty for defendants under the age of 18, already has eli-
cited unusually searching commentary. Some analysts have taken Roper as yet
another indication of the Court’s growing wariness of the death penalty; others
have focused on the escalating battle between the majority and Justice Scalia
over the use of ‘‘international opinion’’ to adjudicate questions of American
Constitutional Law; and still a third group has drawn attention to the Court’s
willingness to overturn its relatively recent decision in Stanford v. Kentucky
(1989) to hold for Christopher Simmons (see, e.g., Babbin 2005; Banner 2005;
Greenhouse 2005).
What has received virtually no attention, somewhat surprisingly, is that the
justices were not the first to overturn Stanford: the Missouri Supreme Court set
aside Simmons’s death sentence on the ground that ‘‘a national consensus has
developed against the execution of juvenile offenders . . . since Stanford.’’ But
only Justices O’Connor and Scalia, writing in dissent, seemed to notice that
a state court had directly defied precedent established by the top of the judicial
hierarchy, the Supreme Court of the United States. ‘‘To add insult to injury,’’
Scalia wrote, ‘‘the Court affirms the Missouri Supreme Court without even
admonishing that court for its flagrant disregard of our precedent in Stanford.
Until today, we have always held that it is this Courts prerogative alone to
overrule one of its precedents.’ . . . Today, however, the Court silently appro-
ves a state-court decision that blatantly rejected controlling precedent.’’
Scalia, of course, could have said much the same of the Fourth Circuit’s
decision in United States v. Dickerson (1999),2 and the Fifth’s in Hopwood v.
Texas (1996)3—not to mention any number of subtler forms of lower
2. InDickerson, the circuit court held that states under its supervision need not followMiranda
v. Arizona (1966).
3. InBakke v. California (1978), the US SupremeCourt ruled that, under certain circumstances,
universities may take race and other factors into account when they make admissions decisions.
But in Hopwood (1996:963), the Fifth Circuit held ‘‘that the University of Texas School of Law
may not use race as a factor in deciding which applicants to admit in order to achieve a diverse
student body, to combat the perceived effects of a hostile environment at the law school, to al-
leviate the law schools poor reputation in the minority community, or to eliminate any present
effects of past discrimination by actors other than the law school.’’
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court deviation from precedents set by a higher court (e.g., distinguishing,
limiting, or avoiding precedents). Indeed, as one observer noted well over
half a century ago, ‘‘[Many] precedents have been rejected through the strat-
agem of distinguishment; others have been the subject of conscious judicial
oversight. As a consequence, judicial discretion among inferior judges is not
so confined and limited as legal theorists would have it’’ (Comment 1941,
1448–9).
This observation raises a question that, depending on one’s perspective, may
be posed two different ways:Why do lower courts defy higher courts, or, given
the minute percentage of lower court cases that are heard and reversed (these
days, under 1%), why do lower courts comply with higher courts?
No shortage of scholarly responses exists but strategic models following
from agency theory are particularly prominent in the contemporary literature.
In general, these accounts assume heterogeneous policy preferences among
judges and examine the incentives and opportunities created by various in-
stitutional features of the modern judicial hierarchy. But the specifics of the
models vary, as do (at least some of) their empirical implications. One class
emphasizes litigant policing by affected parties and suggests that lower
courts will be more likely to deviate from Supreme Court precedent when
the trial court judge and the appellate court panel share similar ideological
dispositions (thereby enabling them implicitly to collude against a litigant
and thus to keep information from the Supreme Court) (see generally,
McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; Lupia and McCubbins 1994). A second
set stresses strategic auditing by the Supreme Court in settings of ‘‘adverse
selection,’’ and anticipates a higher likelihood of disobedience when ideo-
logical diversity on the lower court panel is low (thereby decreasing the like-
lihood of dissent and thus of an audit) (see, e.g., Cross and Tiller 1998;
Cameron et al. 2000). Yet a third class highlights implicit tournaments to
avoid review among lower court judges in a setting of ‘‘moral hazard’’
(see, e.g., Cameron 1993; McNollgast 1994). Among the many implications
of this approach is that the odds of deviation increase as the ideological dis-
tance grows between the population of judges on the appellate courts and the
Supreme Court.
Other specific hypotheses from principal-agent accounts are easy enough to
derive. What may be more challenging, if past efforts are any indication, is
empirically assessing them. The chief obstacle, it seems, is the lack of a reliable
and validmeasurement strategy for placing judges of lower courts and justices
of higher courts in the same policy space. Without such a strategy, we can
systematically test few, if any, hypotheses flowing from agency accounts.With
such an approach not only can we investigate the implications of these models,
we can assess many others flowing from the general positive political theory
(PPT) program on judging, as well. So, for example, assuming that legislatures
and executives too can be placed in the same space, we can consider the extent
to which the separation-of-powers (SoP) system constrains lower courts—an
understudied subject but nonetheless one of considerable interest to scholars
working in the field (e.g., Revesz 2001).
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It is to the challenge of scaling judges and justices (as well as legislatures
and executives) that we turn in this article. We begin by explicating our mea-
surement strategy, and then by explaining its advantages over previous efforts.
Next we explore the results of our approach, and provide a descriptive look at
data it yields: a ‘‘Judicial Common Space’’ (JCS) score for all justices and
judges serving between 1953 and 2000. The last section offers three contem-
porary applications—all of which, we hope, shore up the suitability and adapt-
ability of the JCS for the PPT project.
2. Measurement Strategy
The goal of our measurement strategy is to place Supreme Court justices and
Court of Appeals judges into a policy space that we call the JCS.4 Any mea-
surement strategy that meets this goal should have a number of properties. The
measures should be reliable and valid, they should not be issue or time depen-
dent (e.g., they should be amenable to backdating and updating with the avail-
ability of new data), and, ideally, they should be comparable to measures
developed for members of Congress and the President. The measurement strat-
egy we outline below meets these desirata.
The starting point for our approach is the NOMINATE Common Space
scores (Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Poole 1998) that are the result of a scaling
algorithm that takes a set of issue scales (in this case, a set of measures for
Representatives, Senators, and Presidents) fit term by term. Using legislators
who have served in both chambers, Presidents who have served in the legis-
lature, and stated presidential vote intentions, the algorithm provides an ideal
point for all Representatives, Senators, and Presidents in a two-dimensional
Downsian issue space (Downs 1957). We use only the predominant first di-
mension for our analysis (available for the 75th [1937] through the 108th
[2004] Congress) (Poole 2005).5
Developed by Giles et al. (2001, 2002), the state-of-the-art measure for the
preferences of US Court of Appeals judges (and, for that matter, federal district
court judges) too relies on the Common Space scores but exploits the norm of
senatorial courtesy. If a judge is appointed from a state where the President
and at least one home-state Senator are of the same party, the nominee is assigned
theNOMINATECommonSpace score of the home-state Senator (or the average
of the home-state Senators if both members of the delegation are from the Pres-
ident’s party). If neither home-state Senator is of the President’s party, the nom-
inee receives theNOMINATECommonSpace score of the appointingPresident.
For our purposes, the approach of Giles et al. has several key advantages.
For one, its developers already have demonstrated that their measure exhibits
face, convergent, and construct validity and outperforms other common
4. Our strategy hinges crucially on Poole’s (1998) NOMINATE Common Space measures, and
we have adopted this name to recognize the profound contribution of his measures to the study of
American political institutions.
5. Supporting this choice are statistical analyses indicating that a single liberal-conservative
dimension structures judicial preferences (see Grofman and Brazill 2002; Martin and Quinn 2002).
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measures, such as the party of the appointing President or the ideology of the
state from which the judge is selected (Giles et al. 2002). Second, the strategy
of Giles et al. locates all sitting circuit court judges in the Common Space.
Which leaves us with only one challenge: locating Supreme Court justices in
the same space. To meet it, we rely on a vote-based measure of Supreme Court
ideology developed by Martin and Quinn (2002).6 These ‘‘Martin-Quinn’’
scores, which are available for all justices in all terms from 1937 to 2003 (Mar-
tin and Quinn 2005a), are derived from voting patterns on the Supreme Court,
and allow justices’ ideal points to change over time. They are dynamic in that
each justice has an ideal point in each term served.7
Because we can calculate the median on the Court for each term from the
Martin-Quinn scores (see Martin et al. 2005), they may seem ideal for our
purposes—but a problem of no small consequence emerges: the Martin-Quinn
measures are not directly comparable to the NOMINATE Common Space
scores. The Common Spaces scores are bounded below by 1 and above
by 1, whereas the Martin-Quinn scores are theoretically unbounded (currently,
they range from about 6 [Justice Douglas] to 4 [Justice Thomas]). What is
more, and as we explain in the Appendix, an insufficient number of ‘‘bridging
observations’’ exists to place circuit court judges and Supreme Court justices
on the same scale. The solution thus must lie in choosing a reasonable trans-
formation from the Martin-Quinn space to the Common Space.
To make this choice, we turn to work by Sala and Spriggs (2004) whose
theoretical tack to transforming Martin-Quinn space into Common Space
hinged on an important article by Moraski and Shipan (1999). In seeking
to model the nomination game played between the President and the Senate
when faced with a vacancy on the Supreme Court, Moraski and Shipan (1999)
classified all nominations as ‘‘unconstrained’’ (the President can make a nom-
ination at his ideal point), ‘‘semiconstrained’’ (the President can move the
Court median closer to his ideal), or ‘‘fully constrained’’ (the President cannot
affect the ideological composition of the Court). Sala and Spriggs (2004) cre-
atively used data from the unconstrained nominations to validate their trans-
formation between the Martin-Quinn and the NOMINATE scores.
Our approach also relies on the unconstrained confirmed nominees to the
Supreme Court to estimate the transformation between theMartin-Quinn space
and the Common Space but we invoke a different transformation (as well as
a distinct validation strategy).8 What results from this procedure is a score for
6. Another possibility would be to map the Segal-Cover (Segal and Cover 1989) scores to the
NOMINATE Common Space. For advantages of the ‘‘M-Q’’ scores over Segal-Cover’s, as well as
other approaches, see Martin and Quinn (2002) and Martin et al. (2005).
7. Owing to modeling approach taken by Martin and Quinn (2002), their scores also are com-
parable over time. As such, the mapping estimated below appropriately projects the scores for all
justices in all terms into the JCS.
8. Sala and Spriggs (2004, 206–7) linearly transform the average Martin-Quinn scores for each
justice to range from1 to 1, and then compare the resultant scores to those for unconstrained pres-
idential nominations. They demonstrate the robustness of their transformation by varying the mean
and variance of the transformed scores.
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each term for each justice (and measures for the Court as a whole, such as its
median member) who resides in the JCS.9
In the next section, we present the details of this estimation exercise, as well
as several validations of the transformation; and in the Appendix, we compare
our measurement strategy against others. For now, though, it is important to
understand the assumptions underlying our approach. First, it requires that the
vote-based NOMINATE Common Space scores and the Martin-Quinn scores
are reasonable measures of actors’ sincere preferences. Although scholars have
provided evidence of sophisticated voting in these institutions (see, e.g.,
Spiller and Gely 1992; Calvert and Fenno 1994; Epstein and Knight 1998;
Martin 2001), owing to the large data sets and the overtime nature of the
scores, we suspect that the effect of insincere behavior is small. Second, in
light of the (solid) case that Giles et al. (2002) make for their inferential mea-
surement strategy, we accept that it is valid.10 Third, we must assume that the
predominant issue dimension across all three institutions taps the same sub-
stantive issues. It might be the case, for example, that actors perceive their
roles quite differently when placed in different institutional settings, thereby
rendering their issue preferences incomparable. If this criticism is to be be-
lieved, it damns not only this empirical exercise but also any theoretical work
that relies on spatial models. Since it is precisely these models that we wish to
assess empirically, we think it sensible to proceed with an empirical approach
consistent with those very models. Finally, we must believe that the transfor-
mation from the Martin-Quinn space to the NOMINATE Common Space is
9. We restrict the domain of this study to calendar years 1953–2000, although the approach can
be backdated and updated using additional data. So, for example, we updated the measures of Giles
et al. (2001) using the most recent NOMINATE Common Space scores (Poole 2005).
More generally, we have made available (on ourWeb site) the following JCS-related databases:
1. For each calendar year 1953–2000, House, Senate, Supreme Court, and Appeals Court (for
each circuit) medians.
2. For all Appeals Court judges in years 1953–2000, updated the scores of Giles et al. (2001);
that is, JCS scores.
3. For all Supreme Court justices in all terms 1952–1999 (calendar year 1953–2000), JCS
scores (transformed Martin-Quinn scores).
Poole (2005) provides NOMINATE Common Space scores (i.e., the location of all members of
the House, Senators, and Presidents) on his Web site.
10. Scherer (2005) argues that in the 1960s, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson moved away
from senatorial courtesy to prevent Southern Democrats from naming segregationists to the bench.
Hence, on her account, the ideology of judges appointed during this period (and perhaps thereafter)
is closer to the appointing President than to home-state Senators. On the other hand, in e-mail
correspondence with us (10 May 2005), Scherer suggests that even if ‘‘senators do not choose
appellate judges anymore’’ the approach of Giles et al. may be plausible because it captures
‘‘the ideology of the pool of elites in a particular state fromwhich the President selects his appellate
judges.’’ For this reason, and those offered by Giles and his colleagues, we rely on the approach of
Giles et al. to place judges and justices in the same space. Analysts wishing to make a different
choice—that is, assign appellate court judges the score of the appointing President rather than the
score of Giles et al.—can obtain the requisite presidential scores from Table 2 or our Web site.
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fundamentally correct. In some ways this is a matter of faith but, as we explain
below, it is a matter that we have tried to validate in several different ways.
3. Estimating the JCS
Placing Supreme Court justices in the JCS requires us, for the reasons we sug-
gest above, to transform the Martin-Quinn scores. The data we use are the
unconstrained (Moraski and Shipan 1999) confirmed nominees to the Supreme
Court (n¼ 15), in addition to the Common Space score for the President (CSi)
and the Martin-Quinn score for the justice in her (his) first year of service
(MQi). A linear transformation will not suffice, recall, because the Martin-
Quinn scores are unbounded (though empirically run from 6 to 4), whereas
the NOMINATECommon Space scores are bounded below at1 and above at
1. It is thus necessary to estimate a nonlinear transformation between these two
variables. We use a rescaled tangent transformation on CSi and fit the follow-
ing model using ordinary least squares:
tan
p
2
CSi
 
¼ b0 þ b1MQi þ ei; ei ; Nð0;r2Þ: ð1Þ
The ensuing arctangent prediction equation has the advantage (over a linear
predictor) of asymptotes at 1 and 1. It is also strictly monotonic and sym-
metric. (Table 1 contains estimates of the parameters of equation (1); Figure 1
graphically depicts the model fit.)
In order to map Martin-Quinn scores into the JCS, we must solve equation
(1) for CSi. The resultant prediction equation, which we refer to as the ‘‘arc-
tangent predictor,’’ is
CS ¼ 2
p
arctanðbˆ0 þ bˆ1MQÞ ¼
2
p
arctanð0:1736þ 0:461MQÞ: ð2Þ
In comparing the linear and arctangent predictors, as we do in Figure 1, it is
clear that both behave quite similarly in the middle of the Martin-Quinn space.
But, as it turns out, for extreme justices the linear predictor inappropriately
places them outside the1 to 1 interval. Substantively speaking, this suggests
that the linear predictor, although suitable for moderate justices, is not so for
those at the ends of the left-right scale.
Figure 1, although informative, reveals little about the face validity of our
transformation. To explore that matter, we first compare the distribution of
ideal points for members of Congress, judges on the federal circuits, and
Table 1. Ordinary Least Squares Estimates for Supreme Court Transformation Model in
Equation (1). R2 ¼ 0.54, SE of the estimate ¼ 0.582, n ¼ 15. Raw Martin-Quinn Scores are
from Martin and Quinn (2005a)
Estimate SE p value
Intercept 0.1736 0.1722 0.3319
M-Q score 0.4610 0.1179 0.0018
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justices on the Supreme Court. We plot these empirical densities in Figure 2.
Of interest here is the distribution for Supreme Court justices, which, in the
transformed Space, looks plausible enough: two modes emerge, one slightly to
the left and the other slightly to the right. The very extreme members (Justices
Douglas and Marshall on the left, Justices Scalia and Thomas on the right)
receive scores near the endpoints of the Common Space. Of note too is the
bimodal distribution of ideal points for the Courts of Appeals.
If the arctangent predictor is reasonable, it also should hold that the meas-
ures are related across institutions. Since 12 Supreme Court justices confirmed
between 1953 and 2000 also served on a circuit court, we can compare their
(Giles et al. 2001) Court of Appeals score with their first-term–transformed
Martin-Quinn score. Should the measures be comparable, they ought line
up on a 45 line.
In Figure 3, we explore this criterion by plotting the scores. Notice, first, that
they correlate quite highly ðqˆ ¼ 0:75Þ, and fall close to the 45 line. This
implies a good model fit. In addition, because half of the points fall above
the 45 line and half below, Figure 3 evinces no directional biases in the trans-
formation (i.e., the transformation does not disproportionally predict overly
liberal or conservative behavior). What this suggests, in turn, is that the final
piece of the JCS—the arctangent predictor in equation (2)—is sensible.
3.1 The Judicial Branch
With the JCS in hand, we can now present comparable measures for the Courts
of Appeals and the Supreme Court. In Figure 4, we plot the year-by-year
Figure 1. Scatter plot of the Common Space score of an unconstrained appointing Pres-
ident on the Martin-Quinn score for the justice’s first term of service, with arctangent and
linear predictors. Common Space scores are from Poole (2005). Raw Martin-Quinn scores
are from Martin and Quinn (2005a).
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Figure 2. Kernel density plots for all actors in the House, Senate, Courts of Appeals, and
Supreme Court, 1953–2000. House and Senate scores are from Poole (2005).
Figure 3. Comparison of Courts of Appeals scores with first-term Supreme Court scores
for judges elevated to the Supreme Court.
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median for 11 numbered circuits and the D.C. Court of Appeals. We also locate
the median of the Supreme Court as a point of reference.
Momentarily, we provide several illustrations of how scholars might deploy
these scores for a range of positive research projects. For now, let us simply
point out that the JCS appears to square with our impressions of the circuits.
So, for example, today’s most liberal are the Second and the Ninth, whereas the
Fourth and Fifth are among the most conservative. Notice too and just as we
might expect, the rightward swing during the Reagan years, followed by a shift
to the left in the 1990s when Clinton added 61 appellate court judges (though,
as we explore in Section 4, the effect of the Clinton regime was stronger in
some circuits than others).
The ideological composition of the entire circuit, as we depict it in Figure 4,
is of importance in many contexts but so too is the composition of an individual
panel. If scholars are interested in modeling venue shopping or the decision
over whether to appeal a district court’s decision, the distribution of the median
judge in possible three-judge panels would be of interest—and we can deploy
the Courts of Appeals measures to identify it. Figure 5 provides a simple ex-
ample. There we use simulation to create the empirical density of the median
judge on three-judge panels for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits in 1998.11 Note
that for the Ninth, a 0.67 probability exists that a panel would be to the left of
Figure 4. Medians in each Court of Appeals, 1953–2000. The light gray line in each cell is
the Supreme Court median.
11. This simulation is based on the assumption that all active judges have an equal probability
of being assigned to a panel and, thus, that no geographic constraints or other norms are at work.
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0 in the JCS; in the much more conservative Fifth Circuit, that probability is
only 0.37. Further, although it is possible to attain a moderately conservative
panel on the Ninth, far less likely is one that is extremely conservative, though
this remains a distinct possibility for the Fifth.
3.2 The Legislative and Executive Branches
A chief advantage of the JCS approach is that the scores are in NOMINATE
Common Space (Poole 1998) that makes possible relatively precise empirical
explorations of the American SoP system. Figure 6 provides one example:
a comparison between the median justice on the Supreme Court with the me-
dian member of the House or Senate. But we need not exclude the executive
from analyses of interbranch politics. Quite the opposite: Since Common
Figure 6. Plot of the medianmember of the House and Senate, 1953–2000. The light gray
line in each cell is the Supreme Court median. House and Senate medians are derived
from Poole (2005).
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Figure 5. Empirical densities of the location of the median judge on a three-judge panel
for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits in 1998.
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Space scores also exist for Presidents (see Table 2), they too can be integrated
into the JCS.
4. Further Applications
As we suggested at the onset, our chief motivation for developing the JCS was
to facilitate assessment of positive theories of the judicial hierarchy. In what
follows we provide a taste of how scholars could deploy our approach to do
just that. Believing that the JCS may be useful for other types of PPT research,
as we have hinted throughout, we supply quick examples of two additional
applications: one centering on the SoP system and the other on judicial nom-
inations.
Our intent here, as our emphasis on ‘‘taste’’ and ‘‘quick’’ implies, is not to
write three additional articles but rather to sketch out how researchers can ex-
ploit the JCS for a range of projects. On the other hand, by offering these exam-
ples, we do not mean to suggest that the JCS is suitable for the assessment of
each and every implication flowing from positive accounts of judging. So, for
example, although the JCS scores are perfectly appropriate for explorations of
the extent to which the preferences and likely actions of elected actors may
constrain the Courts of Appeals, researchers will need to take several addi-
tional steps to deploy them to study the effect of the SoP system on the
US Supreme Court. The distinction here hinges on the underlying data we used
to generate the ideological assessments of the judges and justices: for the for-
mer, we invoke data independent of their votes (the President’s or Senators’
NOMINATE scores); for the justices, we make use of the (transformed)
Martin-Quinn estimates, which are, in fact, developed from votes. To the ex-
tent that accounting for justices’ votes (as is typically the goal in SoP research)
via a preference-based measure that relies on their votes is circular, the pure
JCS scores (i.e., the transformed Martin-Quinn scores) are problematic—but,
we hasten to note, still serviceable. Should analysts wish to study the effect of
the SoP system on the Court’s decisions in the area of, say, civil rights, all they
need to do is remove civil rights cases from data used to generate the Martin-
Quinn estimates, recompute those estimates, and then transform them (as we
Table 2. Location of the Presidents in the Common
Space, 1953–2000. Scores are from Poole (2005)
President Score
Bush I 0.52
Carter 0.54
Clinton 0.44
Eisenhower 0.20
Ford 0.41
Johnson 0.38
Kennedy 0.52
Nixon 0.41
Reagan 0.57
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have done) into the JCS. By purging the particular issue area of interest, in
other words, the JCS scores become perfectly appropriate for use in SoP stud-
ies of the Supreme Court, along with any other research on the role of the
justices’ preferences in decision making. This ‘‘purging’’ step, it is worth re-
iterating, is not necessary in the applications we sketch below since all three
focus on circuit judges, and not justices.
4.1 The Hierarchy of Justice
We began this article with a trio of strategic models flowing from a principal-
agent approach to lower-higher court interactions: litigant policing, strategic
auditing, and ‘‘tournaments’’ among lower courts. To the extent that these rep-
resent distinct conceptual accounts of the hierarchy of justice, they are capable
of generating unique implications. Tournament models, to provide but one ex-
ample, suggest that deviations from Supreme Court precedent are more likely
to occur by judges on lower court panels who have been reversed by the Su-
preme Court (relatively) frequently in prior cases. These ‘‘repeat offenders’’ or
‘‘reversal-insensitive’’ judges, to put it succinctly, may be more likely to de-
viate in future cases.
And yet, since all three strategic models flow from a unifying account—
agency theory—they share several features. Most relevant here is that they
draw a distinction between the preferences of the enacting Court (embodied
in the existing legal doctrine), the preferences of the contemporaneous Su-
preme Court (the preferences of the Court at the time the lower court is con-
sidering the case), and the preferences of the lower court hearing the case.
Hence, regardless of the specific model, three configurations of the players
in ideological space (depicted in Figure 7) are of interest. In Configuration
1, the lower court undertakes doctrinal deviation if it pursues its own prefer-
ences. By doing so, however, it engages in what we might call hierarchical
conformity, as the lower court’s action actually conforms to the preferences of
the contemporaneous Supreme Court. In Configuration 2, the lower court—if it
pursues its own preferences—engages in doctrinal conformity but hierarchical
deviation to the extent that it will reach a decision distant from the preferences
of the current Supreme Court. In Configuration 3, a lower court that pursues its
own preferences engages in both doctrinal and hierarchical deviation.
Following from these configurations are a number of hypotheses common to
all three principal-agent models. For example, lower courts will be more likely
to engage in doctrinal deviation when:
E C,L C E,L L C,E
Configuration 1 Configuration 2 Configuration 3
Figure 7. Preferences of the enacting Supreme Court (E), the contemporaneous Su-
preme Court (C), and the contemporaneous lower court (L).
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1. The spatial location of preferences conforms to Configuration 1 rather
than to Configurations 2 or 3. That is, a lower court L is most likely
to deviate from E when it is allied with the contemporary Court against
the enacting Court.
2. The distance between E and C increases, controlling for configuration.
Thus, even when the lower court prefers the enacting Court’s doctrine,
increasing the distance from the enacting Court to the contemporary
Court leads reversal-sensitive judges to shy away from the enacting
Court’s doctrine.
3. The distance between E and L increases, controlling for configuration.
4. The distance between C and L increases, controlling for configuration
We do not attempt here to assess empirically these and other implications;
again, that would require another article or two. What we wish to point out
instead is that the JCS provides a necessary building bloc—a primitive, real-
ly—for undertaking this task. That is because the scores enable us to place the
enacting Court (doctrine), the lower court, and the current (contemporaneous)
Court in the same policy space.
Figure 8 provides a simple example, depicting the JCS for the two (federal)
lower court deviations we referenced at the article’s outset: Dickerson (a de-
parture fromMiranda; see note 1) and Hopwood (a departure from Bakke; see
note 2). Beginning with Dickerson, note that the JCS resembles Configuration
1 in Figure 7: the enacting Miranda (1966) Court is well to the left of the
Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court (in 1999, when the Fourth decidedDick-
erson). It is thus not particularly surprising that the lower court engaged in
doctrinal deviation but hierarchical conformity. The enacting (Bakke) Court
also was to the left of the Court in 1996, the year the Fifth Circuit handed
Figure 8. Enacting and contemporaneous judicial regimes in the JCS for the Fourth Cir-
cuit in U.S. v. Dickerson and the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood v. Texas. Enacting USSC, the
Supreme Court in Bakke (Hopwood)/Miranda (Dickerson); Circuit Median, the circuit at
the time of Dickerson/Hopwood; and Current USSC, the Supreme Court at the time the
circuit decided Dickerson/Hopwood.
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down its decision in Hopwood. But note that the contemporaneous Court was
closer to Bakke than to the Fifth, suggesting that the lower court, to a certain
extent, engaged in doctrinal and hierarchal deviation. Perhaps, as a tournament
model might suggest, the judges on the lower court panel were repeat offenders
and, thus, somewhat more willing to deviate than otherwise expected. Alter-
natively, a model specifying the conditions of strategic auditing by hierarchi-
cal superiors might best capture the Fifth’s decision.
These possibilities, as well as many others, require far more consideration
than space permits, and they require consideration over a large number of cases
at that. But the important point here is that such an empirical evaluation, and
a rather precise one, is now possible via the JCS. This is not to say that the JCS
supplies all the information necessary to undertake such an analysis: additional
data, such as the number of previous overrulings of panel members by the
Supreme Court, must be amassed. It is only to say that the JCS takes an im-
portant first step.
4.2 The SoP/Checks-and-Balances System
In a seminal article published in the Yale Law Journal, Eskridge (1991) reports
that between 1967 and 1990, Congress overturned 344 statutory decisions—-
nearly two-thirds of which (n ¼ 220) were issued by the lower federal courts,
not the US Supreme Court. Given these numbers, it is somewhat surprising that
few scholars have explored the extent to which the threat of legislative override
constrains circuit court decision making; in fact, Revesz (2001) is the only
(published) systematic effort of which we are aware.12 That article examines
the impact of changes in the party composition of Congress and the President
on the D.C. Circuit’s review of ‘‘health-and-safety decisions’’ rendered by fed-
eral agencies between 1970 and 1996.
The author found no effect. ‘‘The empirical analysis,’’ Revesz asserts, ‘‘does
not support any of the hypotheses derived from the positive political theory
models on the impact of changes in the composition of the political branches
on judicial votes.’’ As a result, he contends, that ‘‘serious questions [emerge]
about the plausibility of the claim by positive political theorists that judicial
review of administrative action serves the interests of the current Congress.’’
Perhaps Revesz is right but in light of his method—which employs political
party as a surrogate for the ideology of Congress, the President, and the Cir-
cuit—as well as plausible theoretical reasons to expect Congress to have some
effect on (lower) federal court decisions (see, e.g., Spiller and Gely 1992;
Epstein and Knight 1998; Segal and Spaeth 2002), his rather strong conclusion
deserves reconsideration. And that is where the JCS may be of use. No longer
do we need deploy party as a (hardly unproblematic) indicator of political pref-
erences;13 and no longer do we need to speculate about the relative distance
12. The effect of the SoP system on the Supreme Court, in contrast, has generated many im-
portant articles. See, for example, Spiller and Gely (1992), Segal (1997), and Bergara et al. (2003).
13. For a recent critique of the use of political party as a measure of ideology, see Martin et al.
(2005).
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(proximity) of Congress to the lower courts; rather, we can easily place Con-
gress, both houses, specific committees, and even individual members of the
legislature in the same policy space as the circuits (see, e.g., Figure 6). So
doing will enable far more accurate assessments of claims embedded in the
PPT literature.
The President too can be integrated more precisely into tests of SoP models:
our JCS database contains an annual score for him, in addition to the legislature
and judiciary (see also Table 2). But other examinations of the effect of pres-
idential regimes on the courts also are possible. So, for example, we can now
assess the impact of any given administration’s appointments on the circuits, as
we do for the Clinton presidency in Figure 9. Note that for some—most notably
the First, Seventh, and Tenth—the President and his advisors barely made
a dent in their ideological composition. For others (especially the Second
and the Sixth), Clinton was able to move them considerably to the left (or
at least to a position far more liberal than the Supreme Court).
4.3 The Judicial Appointments Game
Deploying the JCS to study the effect of presidential regimes on the circuits
may be useful for any number of research projects but perhaps none more so
than appointments to the federal bench. When it comes the circuits, an emerg-
ing body of literature suggests that the duration of delays over appointments to
these courts increases when Senators perceive the nomination as ‘‘critical’’—
meaning that it could swing the ideological balance of the circuit toward the
left or right (see, e.g., Binder and Maltzman 2002). Extant studies tend to de-
fine a critical nomination vis-a`-vis the party affiliation of the nominee or the
Figure 9. The effects of the Clinton presidency on the composition of the Courts of
Appeals and the Supreme Court. Each point represents the circuit median. The vertical
line is the estimated Supreme Court median that remained (relatively) constant between
1993 and 2000.
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appointing President (e.g., Binder and Maltzman [2002] deem a ‘‘critical nom-
ination’’ as one in which the percentage of Democratic judges on the particular
circuit is between 40 and 60). But again, in light of the concerns many scholars
have raised about the use of party-based measures to capture judicial ideology
(see note 12), the JCSmay provide a more precise and valid indicator (see, e.g.,
Figures 4 and 9)—along with, crucially so, a method for capturing the distance
between the Circuit’s political preferences and the Senate’s.
This line of research deals with the confirmation of candidates to the courts
of appeals; another area of interest is the extent to which appointments to these
courts may be telling of the future composition (and perhaps ideological di-
rection) of the US Supreme Court: With only three exceptions since 1969,
every justice appointed to the Supreme Court served as a federal circuit judge;
since 1986, there have been no exceptions. This ‘‘norm of prior judicial ex-
perience’’ (Epstein et al. 2003) seems so inculcated that in their widely pub-
licized ‘‘tournament of judges,’’ Choi and Gulati (2004a, 2004b); allow only
federal circuit court judges to compete for seats on the Supreme Court.
The Choi and Gulati project focuses exclusively on ‘‘objective measures of
merit’’: tournament winners are those judges who publish many opinions, have
high citation rates, express ‘‘independence’’ via dissents, and so on. Whether
this is a desirable approach to filling spots on the high court is arguable.What is
not a matter of debate is that the Choi and Gulati approach fails to capture the
realities of judicial appointments: As research grounded in PPT tells us, Pres-
idents and Senates—although not inattentive to candidates’ qualifications—
are quite concerned with moving the Court’s ideological median as close
as possible to their ideal points; the President, of course, also must attend
to critical players within the Senate so as to ensure confirmation of his can-
didate (see, e.g., Segal et al. 1992; Moraski and Shipan 1999).
Here too the JCS can help in assessing predictions generated by an important
line of PPT research. Certainly we can deploy the scores to identify the pref-
erences of the key actors in the appointment process; we also might make use
of them to consider how particular candidates from the circuits could affect
the Court’s median. Figure 10, which employs the JCS scores to map the posi-
tions of the current justices, and Table 3, which lists the scores of six leading
Figure 10. JCS scores for the October 2003 term of the US Supreme Court.
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candidates for a seat on the Court, provide the makings of such a consider-
ation.14
Beginning with Figure 10, notice that the mapping conforms to common
perceptions: Scalia and Thomas anchor the right, with the four ‘‘liberals’’
on the left. O’Connor, of course and in line with virtually every account of
the current Court, is the median. Now consider the JCS scores of the oft-men-
tioned contenders (all sitting circuit court judges) for a position on the Court
should O’Connor or Rehnquist depart at the end of the 2004 term. Each pos-
sible nominee, as Table 3 shows, is quite conservative—a result that also com-
ports with conventional wisdom about these would-be justices.
Assuming that George W. Bush is free to nominate anyone on this list—a
potentially problematic assumption in light of the possibility of a filibuster—
and assuming that the President prefers a more conservative to a more liberal
median—a far less onerous assumption—will the Court move much to the
right? In the case of a Rehnquist retirement the answer is no: all the names
in Table 3 are to the right of the median, O’Connor. That is not so if it is
O’Connor who vacates her seat: Should Bush appoint any candidate listed
in the table, Kennedy would move into the median position, with the resulting
Court a good deal more conservative.
Such predictions are of contemporary interest but historical counterfactuals
are also possible. Suppose, for example, that Ronald Reagan had appointed
Richard Posner rather than Anthony Kennedy to the seat vacated by Lewis
Powell in the 1986–1987 term (see Figure 11). This is a hypothetical over
which many scholars have speculated but we need not engage in uninformed
guesswork. Both Kennedy and Posner were circuit court judges in 1986–1987,
with JCS scores of 0.409 and 0.006, respectively. In other words, at the time of
Powell’s retirement we would predict Kennedy to be among the more conser-
vative members of the Court, whereas Posner would have replaced Powell as
the median.
Table 3. JCS Scores for Leading (G.W. Bush) Candidates for a Seat on the US Supreme
Court
Name Circuit JCS score
Samuel Alito Third since 1990 0.525
Emilio Garza Fifth since 1991 0.532
Michael Luttig Fourth since 1991 0.250
Michael McConnell Tenth since 2003 0.347
John Roberts D.C. since 2003 0.538
J. Harvie Wilkinson Fourth since 1984 0.259
14. We drafted this article prior to Sandra Day O’Connor’s departure from and John G. Rob-
erts’s nomination to the Supreme Court (as of this writing, Roberts has yet to be confirmed). Owing
to the possibility of other vacancies in the near future, not to mention current interest in Roberts, we
decided to retain this section as we originally wrote it.
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5. Conclusion
Theorizing about the hierarchy of justice could take many forms. But requisite
(though insufficient) to assessing the empirical implications of virtually any
positive account of lower-higher court interactions is a method for capturing
the preferences of both courts and, crucially, the distance between them. In this
article, we offer such a measurement strategy—the JCS—a strategy we believe
to be both valid and reliable.
At the same time, we have worked to show that the JCS may have something
to offer to the PPT program beyond its concern with the judicial hierarchy.
Many other projects flowing from that program also have made effective
use of spatial bargaining models to generate insights about the formation
of law and policy. Some have been subjected to rigorous empirical scrutiny;
others are left untested or simply illustrated with one or two exemplary cases.
We believe that JCS can offer a corrective—in the form of foundational
tool—to test rigorously the predictions of these models. Although it might
be tempting to dismiss this measurement strategy—or, for that matter, any
measurement strategy that necessitates comparisons between (or among) jus-
tices, judges, legislators, and executives—we ought to keep in mind that the
theoretical models themselves rest on these assumptions. If we desire to assess
adequately their empirical implications, as we should, then measures such as
the JCS are fundamental to the enterprise.
Appendix
Other Modeling Strategies
Over the last decade or so, measurement models have enjoyed something of
a renaissance in the social sciences (e.g., Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Clinton
et al. 2004). Can we identify a model-based strategy for operationalizing
a JCS—a strategy that might be distinct from the NOMINATECommon Space
but would nonetheless allow scholars to study the judicial hierarchy? We have
explored a number of options, and our best guess is ‘‘no.’’ Let us elaborate.
Social scientists have developed essentially three model-based strategies to
place actors from different institutions into a common space. One set uses indi-
viduals to ‘‘bridge’’ observations across institutions. Poole (1998), for exam-
ple, exploits the fact that many Senators served in the House, and some
Figure 11. JCS scores for the October 1986 term of the US Supreme Court.
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Presidents served in the House, Senate, or both to derive the NOMINATE
Common Space measures (he also counts Presidents as voting when they an-
nounce their vote intentions on particular bills).15 To deploy Poole’s scaling
algorithm, the researcher must have sufficient data to scale actors in both insti-
tutions. Scaling the Supreme Court is relatively straightforward (Martin and
Quinn 2002); scaling the circuit courts, however, is essentially impossible due
to the existence of three-judge panels. With only three actors casting votes in
each individual case, not enough data exist to estimate ideal points and case-
specific parameters.16 Using overlapping service is thus not viable in this con-
text, although, as we show in Figure 3, it can be used to validate measures.
The second model-based approach employs common cases or bills to bridge
institutions (Bailey and Chang 2001). If we are willing to believe that choices
within an institution are strategically independent of one another, then, we can
compare, say, a congressional vote on a statute with a Supreme Court decision
in the statutory context. Bailey and Chang (2001) exploit this design to scale
members of Congress, the President, and Supreme Court justices. But, for two
reasons, this approach is deficient when dealing with data from the Courts of
Appeals. First, it is improbable that circuit court judges act sincerely on cases,
especially on those they believe the Supreme Court might review. Second, the
circuit court sets the reversion point from the Supreme Court. This implies that
a ‘‘liberal’’ vote on the appellate tribunal may be distinct from a ‘‘liberal’’ vote
on the Supreme Court since the status quo points are different.
Nonetheless, and despite these criticisms, we were interested in how such an
approach would perform in practice. Accordingly, we collected data on every
circuit court decision that led to a Supreme Court case (1946–2003), and coded
the polarity of the decision (liberal or conservative). Typically this (extremely
sparse) vote matrix produced 12 votes per case: the nine Supreme Court jus-
tices and the three judges on the panel. We then fit a one-dimensional item
response theory model to this vote matrix using MCMCpack (Martin and
Quinn 2005b), identifying the model by fixing Rehnquist at 3 and Marshall
at 3.
In Figure 12, we plot the results of this analysis. In the left-hand cell, we
compare the Supreme Court estimates with those from a model fit only to the
justices. These points should line up on the 45 line, but it is clear that they do
not, that instead a conservative bias emerges. Estimates from the full model are
even further to the right.
In the right-hand cell, we compare the distributions of estimated ideal points
for the Supreme Court justices with the circuit court judges. Here, we see a lib-
eral bias for the distribution of Court of Appeals judges and a conservative bias
for Supreme Court justices. This is not terribly surprising since the Supreme
Court typically reverses decisions of the appellate court. But it does suggest
15. Howard and Nixon (2003) exploit federal judges who previously served in Congress to
estimate a prediction equation to bridge the Supreme Court and the legislative branch.
16. One interesting approach might be to exploit en banc review that all (or, in the case of some
circuits, a significant fraction of) judges in a circuit confront the same legal stimuli.
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that, facially, the measures derived from this scaling exercise are inappropri-
ate. In other words, bridging via case stimuli will not work in this context.
A final strategy is to embed a strategic model within the statistical measure-
ment model. Two examples of this approach are Clinton and Meriowitz
(2004), which explicitly models the agenda over a handful of congressional
votes, and Martin and Quinn (2001), which invokes a hierarchical model to
recover status quo and alternative points for Supreme Court cases using infor-
mation about the circuit of origin. These (very technical) approaches exhibit
some promise, but the three-judge panel makes them infeasible without ex-
traordinary assumptions about case stimuli. We are thus skeptical about the
promise of these approaches in the context of the hierarchy of justice.
References
Babbin, Jed. 2005. ‘‘Poisonous Penumbras.’’ American Spectator. http://www.spectator.org/
dsp_article.asp?art_id=7976. (accessed April 4, 2005) (on-line version).
Bailey, Michael, and Kelly Chang. 2001. ‘‘Comparing Presidents, Senators, and Justices: Inter-
Institutional Preference Estimation,’’ 17 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 477–506.
Banner, Stuart. 2005. ‘‘When Killing a Juvenile was Routine.’’ New York Times, March 6, p. 4.
Bergara, Mario, Barak Richman, and Pablo T. Spiller. 2003. ‘‘Modeling Supreme Court Strategic
Decision Making: The Congressional Constraint,’’ 28 Legislative Studies Quarterly 247–80.
Binder, Sarah A., and Forrest Maltzman. 2002. ‘‘Senatorial Delay in Confirming Federal Judges,
1947–1998,’’ 46 American Journal of Political Science 477–506.
Calvert, Randall L., and Richard F. Fenno Jr. 1994. ‘‘Strategy and Sophisticated Voting in the
Senate,’’ 56 Journal of Politics 349–76.
Figure 12. Comparison of estimates from an item response theorymodel fit to data for the
Vinson-Rehnquist Courts (through the 2003 term). The votes cast by the Court of Appeals
judges are coded for each Supreme Court case, where applicable. The left cell compares
Supreme Court estimates from Supreme Court–only model (Martin and Quinn 2002) to
those from a full model that includes the Court of Appeals judges. The right cell shows
the densities of the estimated ideal points for the Courts of Appeal judges and Supreme
Court justices.
The JCS 21
Cameron, Charles M. 1993. ‘‘Decision-Making and Positive Political Theory (Or, Using Game
Theory to Study Judicial Politics).’’ Paper presented at the Wallis Institute of Political Econ-
omy, Rochester, N.Y.
Cameron, Charles M., Jeffrey A. Segal, and Donald R. Songer. 2000. ‘‘Strategic Auditing in a Po-
litical Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme Courts Certiorari Decisions,’’ 94
American Political Science Review 101–16.
Choi, Stephen J., and G. Mitu Gulati. 2004a. ‘‘A Tournament of Judges?’’ 92 California Law Re-
view 299–322.
———. 2004b. ‘‘Choosing the next Supreme Court Justice,’’ 78 Southern California Law Review
23–117.
Clinton, Joshua, Simon Jackman, and Douglas Rivers. 2004. ‘‘The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call
Data,’’ 98 American Political Science Review 355–70.
Clinton, Joshua D., and Adam Meriowitz. 2004. ‘‘Testing Explanations of Strategic Voting in
Legislatures: A Reexamination of the Compromise of 1790,’’ 48 American Journal of Political
Science 675–89.
Comment. 1941. ‘‘The Attitude of Lower Courts to Changing Precedents,’’ 50 Yale Law Journal
1448–59.
Cross, Frank B., and Emerson H. Tiller. 1998. ‘‘Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doc-
trine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals,’’ 107 Yale Law Journal 2155–75.
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper & Row.
Epstein, Lee, and Jack Knight. 1998. The Choices Justices Make. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.
Epstein, Lee, Jack Knight, and AndrewMartin. 2003. ‘‘The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience and
Its Consequences for Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court,’’ 91 California Law Review
903–66.
Eskridge, William N., Jr. 1991. ‘‘Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions,’’
101 Yale Law Journal 331–417.
Giles, Micheal W., Virgina A. Hettinger, and Todd Peppers. 2001. ‘‘Picking Federal Judges: A
Note on Policy and Partisan Selection Agendas,’’ 54 Political Research Quarterly 623–41.
———. 2002. ‘‘Measuring the Preferences of Federal Judges: Alternatives to Party of the Appoint-
ing President.’’ Emory University Typescript.
Greenhouse, Linda. 2005. ‘‘Supreme Court, 5-4, Forbids Execution in Juvenile Crime.’’ New York
Times, p. 1A.
Grofman, Bernard, and Timothy J. Brazill. 2002. ‘‘Identifying the Median Justice on the Supreme
Court through Multidimensional Scaling: Analysis of Natural Courts 1953–1991,’’ 112 Public
Choice 55–79.
Howard, Robert M., and David C. Nixon. 2003. ‘‘Local Control of the Bureaucracy: Federal
Appeals Courts, Ideology, and the Internal Revenue Service,’’ 13Washington University Jour-
nal of Law and Policy 233–56.
Lupia, Arthur, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1994. ‘‘Learning from Oversight: Fire Alarms and
Police Patrols Reconstructed,’’ 10 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 96–125.
Martin, Andrew D. 2001. ‘‘Congressional Decision Making and the Separation of Powers,’’ 95
American Political Science Review 361–78.
Martin, Andrew D., and Kevin M. Quinn. 2001. ‘‘Bayesian Learning About Ideal Points of Su-
preme Court Justices, 1953–1999.’’ Presented at the 2001 Political Methodology Summer
Meeting.
———. 2002. ‘‘Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Su-
preme Court, 1953–1999,’’ 10 Political Analysis 134–53.
———. 2005a. ‘‘Ideal Points for the U.S. Supreme Court (November 19, 2004).’’ http://mqscor-
es.wustl.edu/ (accessed April 1, 2005).
———. 2005b. MCMCpack: Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) Package. R Package Version
0.6-4. http://cran.rproject.org.
Martin, AndrewD., Kevin Quinn, and Lee Epstein. 2005. ‘‘TheMedian Justice on the United States
Supreme Court,’’ 83 North Carolina Law Review 1275–322.
McCubbins, Mathew D., and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. ‘‘Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Po-
lice Patrols Versus Fire Alarms,’’ 28 American Journal of Political Science 165–79.
22 The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization
McNollgast. 1994. ‘‘Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of
Law,’’ 68 Southern California Law Review 1631–82.
Moraski, Brian J., and Charles R. Shipan. 1999. ‘‘The Politics of Supreme Court Nominations: A
Theory of Institutional Choice and Constraints,’’ 43 American Journal of Political Science
1069–95.
Poole, Keith T. 1998. ‘‘Estimating a Basic Space from a Set of Issue Scales,’’ 42 American Journal
of Political Science 954–93.
———. 2005. ‘‘Common Space Scores, Congresses 75-108 (March 9, 2005).’’ http://voteview.-
com/basic.htm (accessed April 1, 2005).
Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll-
Call Voting. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Revesz, Richard L. 2001. ‘‘Congressional Influence on Judicial Behavior,’’ 76New York University
Law Review 1100–41.
Sala, Brian R., and James F. Spriggs III. 2004. ‘‘Designing Tests of the Supreme Court and the
Separation of Powers,’’ 57 Political Research Quarterly 197–208.
Scherer, Nancy. 2005. Scoring Points: Politicians, Activists and the Lower Federal Court Appoint-
ment Process. Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
Segal, Jeffrey A. 1997. ‘‘Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Law and Courts,’’
91 American Political Science Review 28–44.
Segal, Jeffrey A., Charles M. Cameron, and Albert D. Cover. 1992. ‘‘A Spatial Model of Roll Call
Voting: Senators, Constituents, Presidents, and Interest Groups in Supreme Court Confirma-
tions,’’ 36 American Journal of Political Science 96–121.
Segal, Jeffrey A., and Albert D. Cover. 1989. ‘‘Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme
Court Justices,’’ 83 American Political Science Review 557–65.
Segal, Jeffrey A., and Harold J. Spaeth. 2002. The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revis-
ited. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Spiller, Pablo T., and Rafael Gely. 1992. ‘‘Congressional Control of Judicial Independence: The
Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949–1988,’’ 23 RAND Jour-
nal of Economics 463–92.
The JCS 23
